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entire region will be increasingly involved in dealing with a more ambitious and yet dissatisfied Communist
state, since China still recalls the humiliations of the nineteenth century when
it was ‘sliced’ like a melon among rival
imperialists and still shares disputed
land and sea borders with many countries.” America’s potential problems
with China have been exacerbated in
recent years by the disappearance of the
European powers from Southeast Asia,
Hong Kong, and Macao, and the precipitous decline of Russia in Northeast
Asia, making China the only “possible
contender for the American laurels.”
Buckley, a Hong Kong–born, Britisheducated, and Japan-based scholar, is
generally friendly to the United States
and supportive of its East Asian policies. However, he has his fair share of
criticism for U.S. policy makers, in particular Franklin Roosevelt’s “casualness” in his dickering with Stalin at
Yalta, Harry Truman’s huge military reductions immediately prior to the Korean War, and Lyndon Johnson’s and
Richard Nixon’s “humiliating” defeat in
Vietnam. In the near term, Buckley
warns, in addition to remaining the
bulwark of Asia Washington must initiate wider regional interdependence
among East Asian countries. Asian nations, instead of focusing on the United
States as the Holy Grail for everything
from democracy to human rights to
capitalism, might do better to look at
“British, European and Anglo-Pacific
approaches to such issues” in order to
spread their cultural horizons. To the
extent that “globalization is frequently
equated with Americanization,” Buckley warns, the Asia-Pacific region may
one day resent such influence as an unwelcome American intrusion.
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This book went to press immediately
before “9/11” and the war on terror. As
a result, Buckley underestimates Japan’s
potential naval contribution to any
multinational military effort, suggesting
instead that “Japan appears most unlikely to deploy its so-called self-defense
forces for anything much beyond the
rescue of its own citizens in emergency
situations abroad.” Buckley’s emphasis
on the close interaction and interdependence of U.S. security and economic
policies throughout the Asia-Pacific region are, however, as relevant now as
ever. Buckley concludes by warning
that Americans must energetically face
up to the myriad of risks—chief among
them the growing threat from China—
associated with being the dominant
Asia-Pacific power.
BRUCE A. ELLEMAN

Naval War College

Knox, MacGregor and Williamson Murray, eds.
The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050.
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001. 203pp.
$28

The editors of this slim volume of essays have wide ambitions. In 194 pages
of text, they seek to define the nature
of military revolutions; describe the
tripartite sources of the concept in the
still-controversial work of historian
Michael Roberts on seventeenthcentury European land warfare, Soviet
military theory, and studies by Andrew
W. Marshall’s Office of Net Assessment;
and critique contemporary developments in American ground and air warfare. Furthermore, to support their
arguments, Knox and Murray present
case studies from seven centuries of
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armed conflict in the West. Between
their introductory essay on the concept
of a revolution in military affairs (RMA)
and their concluding analysis of the
shortcomings of the “American RMA,”
Knox and Murray place eight chapters
on historical examples of military revolutions. There is one essay each by
Knox and Murray (on the French Revolutionary army and the German blitzkrieg, respectively). The others are by
equally prominent military historians:
Clifford J. Rogers on fourteenthcentury military developments under
England’s Edward III; John A. Lynn on
Louis XIV’s army; Mark Grimsley on
the U.S. Civil War; Dennis E. Showalter
on the mid-nineteenth-century Prussian army; Holger H. Herwig on
changes in naval warfare, 1885–1914,
exemplified by the British and Germans; and Jonathan B. A. Bailey on the
creation of modern warfare in World
War I. The accuracy, comprehensiveness, and thoughtfulness of every essay
are outstanding—a rare achievement
in an anthology. The editors deserve
commendation.
Each part of this volume is excellent,
yet Knox and Murray have set themselves such a daunting goal—to integrate coherently arguments based on
episodes of Western military history
with contemporary defense policy analysis—that they fall somewhat short.
While all the essays are fine offerings,
Rogers’s essay fits awkwardly alongside
case studies of RMAs from the time of
Louis XIV to the present, and Herwig’s
accentuates the absence of other essays
on the transformations of naval warfare
in the age of sail and after 1918. Historical examples drawn almost exclusively
from British, French, German, and
American military history suggest a
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certain cultural bias; the selection neglects significant contributions over the
past four and a half centuries to transforming western military theory and
practice by the Dutch, Danes, Swedes,
Spanish, Italians, Poles, and Russians.
Since the editors stress the Soviet contribution to the RMA concept, their
failure to include a Red Army case
study seems egregious. The origins of
the book in papers delivered at a small
conference at Quantico in 1996 help explain its limitations. Nonetheless, a
work of such ambitious intellectual
scope would have benefited from double or even triple the number of chapters, with a greater geographical and
topical inclusiveness.
Paradoxically, this reviewer’s disappointment arises from the great contributions this book does make to
understanding RMAs and redirecting
present American efforts to achieve
one. As all the authors emphasize, and
as Knox and Murray reiterate in their
conclusion, military revolutions are not
actually based on technology. In fact, an
RMA can occur without major technological innovation at all, as in lateeighteenth-century France. Instead, a
military revolution is a reshaping of
military institutions to solve strategic
and political challenges. Adopting new
weapons and equipment alone, without
institutional reconfiguration, produces
armies such as the British and French
fielded against the Wehrmacht in May
1940. The editors present convincing
arguments that the U.S. military has
adopted new technologies without
interservice integration or, far more important, without attempts to relate
weapons systems, doctrine, force structure, and training to the strategic problems facing the nation. In mitigation,
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Knox and Murray admit that achieving
an RMA in the absence of an identifiable foe as the focus of strategy presents
enormous difficulties. Be that as it may,
they warn, the obstacle the United
States presents to the ambitions of entities outside the Western alliance could
make it the object of someone else’s
RMA. Perhaps that is the greatest warning to arise from the coincidental appearance of this book following 11
September 2001. The Dynamics of Military Revolution raises critical questions
about how the United States might reshape its military to counter strategies
based on asymmetrical warfare. Beyond
the valuable contribution the book
makes to military history, one hopes
this volume will also help shape the national security debate currently in
progress.
BRIAN R. SULLIVAN

Vienna, Virginia

Gilbert, Marc Jason, ed. Why the North Won the
Vietnam War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002. 254pp. $69.95

Since the fall of Saigon in the spring of
1975, Americans have sought to understand how their government could have
lost the Vietnam War. Given the enormous gap in resources between the
United States and the Vietnamese revolutionaries, it is difficult for even scholars of the war to explain why this
nation’s mighty military machine failed
to defeat its enemy’s forces. Many who
have written about the war have focused on the alleged mistakes of American civilian and military leaders,
arguing that more enlightened policies,
such as fewer restrictions on military
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operations or more emphasis on pacification, would have turned the tide in
South Vietnam. The purpose of the
eight essays in this volume is to place
American policies in a broader context—
or, as Gilbert writes, to recognize that
“the outcome of that war was determined less at MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] and
Washington than by the persistence of
the enemy on the battlefield and in political cultures of the Saigon regime, the
National Liberation Front, and its partners in Hanoi.”
The most original essays in this volume,
by William J. Duiker, George C. Herring, and Robert K. Brigham, pursue aspects of this theme. Duiker traces the
efforts of the government in Hanoi “to
manipulate the international and diplomatic environment to its own advantage” and its complicated relations with
China and the Soviet Union, allies
whose aid was vital to the North Vietnamese war effort. Herring emphasizes
the international dimensions of America’s defeat, noting how the inability of
the Lyndon Johnson administration to
gain support from European allies undermined the U.S. war effort. Brigham
challenges the traditional distinction
between northerners and southerners,
arguing that it is misleading to divide
“the struggle along geographical lines
that have no cultural or historical precedent.” Northerners, he argues, did
not make all of the key decisions in the
war; rather, southerners came to dominate party councils in Hanoi and were
able to convince their northern comrades to pursue a more aggressive strategy in the South.
The other five essays focus, with varying
degrees of success, more on the American
side of the war. In a forcefully argued
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